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Classification Situations: Life-Chances 
in the Neoliberal Era 
Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy ∗ 
Abstract: »Klassifikations-Lagen. Lebenschancen in der neoliberalen Ära«. This 
article examines the stratifying effects of economic classifications. We argue 
that in the neoliberal era market institutions increasingly use actuarial tech-
niques to split and sort individuals into classification situations that shape life-
chances. While this is a general and increasingly pervasive process, our main 
empirical illustration comes from the transformation of the credit market in 
the United States. This market works as both as a leveling force and as a con-
denser of new forms of social difference. The U.S. banking and credit system 
has greatly broadened its scope over the past twenty years to incorporate pre-
viously excluded groups. We observe this leveling tendency in the expansion of 
credit amongst lower-income households, the systematization of overdraft pro-
tections, and the unexpected and rapid growth of the fringe banking sector. 
But while access to credit has democratized, it has also differentiated. Scoring 
technologies classify and price people according to credit risk. This has allowed 
multiple new distinctions to be made amongst the creditworthy, as scores get 
attached to different interest rates and loan structures. Scores have also ex-
panded into markets beyond consumer credit, such as insurance, real estate, 
employment, and elsewhere. The result is a cumulative pattern of advantage 
and disadvantage with both objectively measured and subjectively experienced 
aspects. We argue these private classificatory tools are increasingly central to 
the generation of „market-situations“, and thus an important and overlooked 
force that structures individual life-chances. In short, classification situations 
may have become the engine of modern class situations. 
Keywords: Market classifications, market sociology, market order, categoriza-
tion, credit scores.  
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1.  Introduction1 
Academics often remind others that familiar categories are difficult to question, 
but they are hardly immune to the problem themselves. Consider the case of 
social class. In general, contemporary approaches see classes as rooted in pro-
duction, specifically the employment relation. This view descends from Marx, 
who argued that the beginning of class is one’s relationship to the means of 
production. Notwithstanding the nuanced analysis of class relations in his polit-
ical writings (e.g., in The 18th Brumaire and elsewhere), what stuck with soci-
ologists was Marx and Engels’s insistence that class analysis is, at its core – or 
“in the last instance,” as people used to say – a matter of owning or not owning 
the means of production. Classes are defined antagonistically on that basis. 
Capitalists call the shots in the labor market and workers are forced to accept 
the terms on offer.  
The core problem for later theorists has been to make sense of the rise of 
service and managerial occupations within this underlying relational structure. 
Scholars edged towards a Weberian view (Breen 2005; Wright 1985), eschew-
ing a scheme of intrinsically antagonistic classes in favor of a more refined 
spectrum of class situations, or life chances, on various markets. People own 
(or do not own) different sorts of property, or they bring different skills to the 
market, or have different services to buy or sell.  
In their efforts to build on Weber’s insights and to reconcile theory with da-
ta, contemporary formulations of class theory became more precise, and tab-
leaux of class membership more complex. Sociology’s most influential state-
ments on the subject, such as Wright (1985), Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993), 
and Grusky and Sørensen (1998), set out to operationalize the concept of class 
in a way that connected it to the process of socio-economic attainment. Largely 
framed by the methods and concerns of Anglo-American mobility research, the 
challenge was to develop a class-based analysis that could make sense of the 
elusive “middle” of the American occupational structure. But this meant that 
                                                             
1  We thank Steven Barley, Irene Bloemraad, Bruce Carruthers, David Cooper, Eve Chiapello, 
Matthew Desmond, Marie-Laure Djelic, Derek Hoff, Andreas Kalyvas, Daniel Kluttz, Jeanne 
Lazarus, Roi Livne, Bruno Palier, Alex Roehrkasse, Matthias Thiemann, Loïc Wacquant, Erik 
Olin Wright, Valery Yakubovich, two anonymous AOS reviewers for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this article or insights about its subject. This work was presented at the 
annual conferences of the American Sociological Association (2011), the Social Science and 
History Association (2011), the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (2011), the 
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contemporary class analysis remained close to its origins in that it still began 
with an analysis of the structure of positions in occupations, firms, and labor 
markets. We shall argue that this has made it hard to connect these theories to 
processes of social stratification that originate outside the sphere of production, 
in settings such as consumer credit systems, education, health services, and 
housing. 
Of course, research on inequality shows other forms of social division be-
side class structure shape people’s access to and experience of basic social 
institutions. Reliably, specific social groups – the poor, minorities, women, 
young people, and others, whether singularly or in various intersections and 
combinations – face a more restrictive set of choices, receive worse treatment, 
and experience worse outcomes than dominant groups in practically every 
institutional domain (Massey 2008). The durability of these inequalities is 
explained, variously, by rational choices on the part of vendors trying to avoid 
catering to riskier individuals (Becker 1971), the persistence of straightforward 
prejudice, or more subtle processes of symbolic violence, pragmatic disqualifi-
cation, or systemic “über” discrimination (Reskin 2012). In this view, modern 
markets reproduce inequalities that originate elsewhere in the social structure, 
in historical legacies, and in longstanding attitudes that differentiate between 
categories of people. The action of markets themselves does not contribute 
much to the formation of social hierarchies. 
What if it did? What if we could make the recording, splitting and categoriz-
ing work done by markets and market technologies “good to think with” for the 
study of social inequality? The point is in some ways familiar. Occupational 
markets have long been structured by institutional devices such as licensing 
and credentialing systems, in addition to rules oriented to exclude certain kinds 
of people. But what makes the new market instruments so interesting is that 
they seem so much more democratic. Indeed, historically their appeal came, in 
part, from their purported ability to keep older forms of arbitrary or categorical 
discrimination at bay (Hyman 2011; Poon 2013). These new markets draw 
distinctions, too, but in a different way. Rather than protecting certain groups 
through the creation of rents and monopolies, they thrive on the market’s com-
petitive logic, demanding that people be measured against one another, and 
then separating and recombining them into groups for efficiency and profit. As 
with class, the process of differentiation is endogenous to the market itself. But 
unlike class, the action happens on the consumption side of the economy, rather 
than on the production side. 
In this article, we focus more particularly on how the emergence and expan-
sion of methods of tracking and classifying consumer behavior affect stratifica-
tion through the allocation of credit. On the supply side, scoring agencies slice 
consumers into behaviorally-defined risk groups, and price offerings to them 
accordingly. On the demand side, consumers find themselves more or less 
comfortably fitting into these categories – which, by design, are not constructed 
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from standard demographic classifications such as race and gender. At the 
intersection of this supply and demand, the increasing sophistication of credit 
scoring generates what we call classification situations: positions in the credit 
market that are consequential for one’s life-chances, and that are associated 
with distinctive experiences of debt. These range from the exploitative to the 
dutiful, and from the dutiful to the almost liberating. Some feel weighed down 
or crushed by debt, others feel the pressure both to acquire and pay off certain 
sorts of loan, and still others embrace credit as a means of asset accumulation 
and mobility. These classification situations are not merely approximations to 
pre-existing social groups, though of course they may overlap substantially in 
specific cases. Rather, they are independently, even “artificially” generated 
classifications that can come to have distinctive and consequential class-like 
effects on life-chances and social identities. 
2.  The Crucible of Class 
2.1  The Standard View 
We begin with Weber and his concept of life chances. It is worth quoting his 
definition of “economic class” at length: 
We may speak of a “class” when (1) a number of people have in common a spe-
cific causal component of their life chances (…). This is “class situation.” (…) 
Property or “lack of property” [are] the basic categories of all class situations. 
…Within these categories, however, class situations are further differentiated: 
on the one hand, according to the kind of property that is usable for returns; 
and, on the other hand, according to the kinds of services that can be offered in 
the market. Class situation is, in this sense, ultimately market situation. (Weber 
1978a, 927-8, emphasis added) 
Notoriously, Weber was not very specific about what he meant by “chance in 
the market.” However, he does offer a telling empirical illustration. Rather than 
pursuing the more Marxist line of analysis he begins with (the distribution of 
material property and skills or “services offered”), Weber ends the passage on 
“economic classes” in Economy and Society with a cryptic reference to the credit 
market: The creditor-debtor relation becomes the basis of “class situation” first in 
the cities, where a “credit market”, however primitive, with rates of interest in-
creasing according to the extent of dearth and factual monopolization of lending 
in the hands of a plutocracy could develop Weber 1978a, 928).  
This suggests that Weber’s view of class situation as life chances in a mar-
ket should be much more broadly applied than it typically has been in the lit-
erature on class analysis. (And, quite possibly, more broadly than Weber him-
self envisioned – but our purposes here are not exegetical.) Our claim is that 
many institutional settings may be analyzed as systems of market-situations, 
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each with its own dynamic of social stratification and its own claim on the 
making of social class. 
The standard picture in stratification research is that a person’s life-chances 
are rooted in their position in the occupational structure, and expressed in their 
pathway through it. One’s occupation (or that of one’s parents) may affect 
one’s health, the likelihood of arrest or prison, the availability of educational 
opportunities, and so on. Often, the model is made more complex by the addi-
tion of alternative bases of stratification, such as racial, ethnic, gender, religion, 
age or family structure.  
In Weber’s view what ultimately determines one’s life chances – one’s spe-
cific market-situation – are individual endowments of various kinds. We would 
now think of these endowments as various sorts of capital. People own (or do 
not own) different sorts of property, they bring different skills (or no skills) to 
the market, they buy and sell various services (or not). It is this individualizing 
tendency in Weber’s theory of stratification – its tendency to unravel class into 
a set of individual locations on a spectrum – that has long been resisted by his 
Marxian critics.  
2.2  From Class Situation to Classification Situation 
What is missing from this view is the notion that allocation to particular mar-
ket-situations might depend on some formal, institutionalized classification 
procedures. Weber recognizes the power and significance of bureaucratic rec-
ords and rules, but does not connect this to his analysis of the market. In We-
ber’s time, insofar as this organizational means was available at all, it was 
almost exclusively a tool of the state bureaucracy. Scholars interested in the 
intersection of rationalized bureaucracy and logics of classification have thus 
looked primarily to the state and its official classifications, which are public in 
nature and carry implications for government policy, identity-formation, and 
collective action (Hacking 1986; Loveman 2013; Schor 2009; Starr 1992; 
Steensland 2010). But many important classificatory systems are now embed-
ded in markets. They are by nature private, even to the point of being trade 
secrets. They are oriented toward the extraction of profit and often manufac-
tured and managed in a quasi-monopolistic manner. For instance one company, 
FICO – originally Fair, Isaac and Company – produces many variants of its 
FICO score, which it claims are used in ninety percent of lending decisions in 
the United States. Combining the fine-grain of Weberian market-situations with 
rationalized organizational methods, these forms of commensuration and cate-
gorization have institutionalized and diffused rapidly. As such, they have be-
come powerful “market devices” whose broader social effects are still not well 
understood (Carruthers 2013; Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007). To emphasize 
our modification of the Weberian framework, we call the outcomes produced 
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by these new technologies classification situations, as distinct from class situa-
tions. 
The starting point for our analysis is thus the operation of market institu-
tions, not the a priori identification of fundamental social categories. In that 
respect our perspective contrasts not only with theories of inequality centered 
on labor-markets, but also with approaches emphasizing the intersectional 
consequences of cross-cutting memberships in racial, class, and gender catego-
ries Collins, 1990; Massey 2008; Tilly 1999). Second, by paying attention to 
explicit, “objective” classificatory techniques rather than implicit, “subjective” 
schemes of perception and action, our approach also differs from Pierre Bour-
dieu’s analysis of the relevance of classificatory struggles to class analysis in 
the last chapter of Distinction (1984). In our case, the classificatory mechanism 
is both more palpable (classifications are bought and sold) and less so (the 
mechanics of classification is impersonal, confidential, and does not allow for 
individual interpretation).  
Rather than seeing how basic social-categorical differences “play out”, are 
“expressed in”, or “distort” institutions, we thus seek to identify, in a manner 
not unlike Bowker and Star (2000), how institutions systematically sort and slot 
people into new types of categories (which we may call “market categories”) 
with different economic rewards or punishments attached to them. On this 
view, the labor market is only one among many institutions that structure life 
chances. Education, health-care, credit, and commodity markets classify their 
participants too, in ways that generate social inequalities rather than simply 
reproducing them. We also expect configurations of classificatory institutions 
in different societies to display similarities and complementarities among 
themselves (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hall and Soskice 2001). This means 
we must attend to the systemic linkages between classificatory mechanisms, 
institutional development, and the wider social environment.  
We argue that dramatic changes in market organization, triggered by the de-
collectivization of social services and risk in the neoliberal era (Hacker 2008), 
have both expanded the supply of services and increased the classifying activi-
ties of institutions. Both credit and higher education, for instance, provide good 
illustrations of these trends with a rapid expansion of access (reversed only 
very recently) and a subsequent internal diversification of supply by price and 
quality. In both cases, providers have learned to tailor their products in specific 
ways in an effort to maximize rents, transforming the sources and forms of 
inequality in the process. 
Substantively, the approach we advocate here has three main implications. 
Comparatively, we should investigate the role of actuarial technologies (Mikes 
2009; Power 2011) in sorting people into a diversified set of life trajectories. In 
this article, we focus on the U.S. credit market as a useful and important empir-
ical site for studying how these new, “classificatory,” mechanisms of social 
stratification operate. But it is worth emphasizing, again, that the point applies 
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much more broadly. These technologies may be less salient or differently im-
plemented in some countries, and thus their effects on stratification may vary 
too. Historically, we should document how the neoliberal shift transformed 
institutions – in our case, institutions devoted to the provision of consumer 
credit – in ways that facilitated the action of classificatory engines. Behind the 
longitudinal inquiry is the argument that recent changes in the organization of 
many markets have affected people’s lives in ways that are often not well cap-
tured by traditional analyses. And theoretically, we ought to reflect on what 
these changes mean for theories of stratification in the neoliberal era. 
3.  Kinds of Classification Situations 
There have been two historical forces behind the development of classification 
situations. The first is technology, namely the growing availability of individu-
al-level data, on the one hand, and the development of statistical models of risk 
on the other. The second is the market economy. As representatives of the 
collective good, states tend to be politically oriented toward universal man-
dates. Under state rule, risks were collectivized, socialized, even though the 
management of such risks became increasingly individualized over time, 
though not necessarily more differentiated (Bauman 2000; Burchell, Gordon, 
and Miller 1991). Private corporations, however, are oriented to profit. In an 
earlier era, some of the risks faced by private credit institutions might have 
been socialized through cross-subsidization. Money lost administering small 
loans in poor neighborhoods, for instance, might have been made up by high 
profits on large loans in richer neighborhoods. More often, however, banks 
turned away from the most destitute places if they could, leaving behind so-
called “banking deserts” (Leyshon and Thrift 1995).2 
The new actuarial technologies have changed all that, allowing capitalist 
firms to systematically make individual assessments of risk, and to turn those 
assessments into economic opportunities through sharply differentiated pricing 
strategies. No wonder, then, that classification situations are especially well-
developed in liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), where private 
markets, rather than states, are the main providers of access to primary goods 
and services such as healthcare, money, insurance or the law, and education. 
3.1  Seeing like a Market 
Weberian sociologists and Chicago-school economists alike argue that markets 
are blind to differences in social status. In the former case, the market “knows 
                                                             
2  This prompted legislation, in 1977, to oblige banks to have a presence in poor communities 
(Community Reinvestment Act). 
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nothing of honor” (Weber 1978b, 936); in the latter, it is an unbiased engine of 
preference aggregation. We suggest instead that markets see social differences 
very well, and thrive on them. Like states, market technologies make societies 
more “legible”, to use Scott’s (1999) phrase. Contemporary market institutions, 
in particular, are inveterate classifiers. They count, rank, measure, tag, and 
score on various metrics of varying degrees of sophistication, automation, and 
opacity. The data collected in these procedures becomes grist for analytical 
machines devoted to further refining the classification system itself, and the 
engine for allocating individuals to some tier or group on the basis of that clas-
sification. 
Fueled by the growing availability of demographic and non-demographic 
data over the last 30 years or so, classificatory efforts by corporations have 
concentrated on the production of increasingly fine-grained knowledge about 
populations of would-be customers. This data is sometimes provided by states 
(demographic data), sometimes bought from market intermediaries (e.g. pur-
chasing histories, employment and medical data, records of online behavior, 
credit scores), or generated by specialists (various forms of market research). 
This knowledge is incorporated into all kinds of actions, from decisions about 
the location of shopping outlets to product segmentation to marketing tactics to 
pricing strategies. Social scientists have been keen to notice the new forms of 
calculability, governmentality and moral regulation embedded in these tech-
niques. But they have stopped short of examining their broader social implica-
tions. 
3.2  Boundary Classifications 
Market institutions produce two main kinds of classification situations. The 
first distinguishes people who are “in” from those who are “out.” For instance, 
people may be qualified to open a bank account – or be denied the ability to do 
so; buy health or car insurance – or not; have access to credit – or not. Let us 
refer to this type of situation, quite simply, as “exclusion” or boundary classifi-
cation. In much of the world, simple lack of access to goods and services, 
whether provided by the state or the market, is of course the dominant form of 
consumption-based classification. It is most obvious where supporting institu-
tions are absent or substandard, as they often are in the developing world. 
Boundary classifications can be collective or individual. A good example of 
collective boundary classifications is the once widespread practice of redlining. 
Redlining excludes entire neighborhoods from services on the basis of some 
undesirable social characteristic, usually race. Such collective forms of exclu-
sion, obviously structured by long histories of institutionally-supported racial 
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segregation,3 are now formally outlawed as discriminatory.4 But their effects 
are still being felt in the form of reversed patterns of geographical location of 
bank branches and “predatory” lenders in white and black neighborhoods 
(Graves 2003), in African-Americans’ weaker personal ties to mainstream 
financial institutions, and in the persistence of more insidious, but pervasive, 
forms of reluctance to lend to African-American individuals and communities 
(Oliver and Shapiro 2006). 
Modern boundaries tend to be drawn individually, for legal as well as tech-
nological reasons. For economists, institutions classifying at the boundary 
address the problem of adverse selection. In a situation of uncertain infor-
mation, they separate cases that are “presumed good” from those that are “pre-
sumed bad” – the smart from the dull, healthy from unhealthy, lazy from hard-
working, prudent from spendthrift. These categories may sound clean and 
clear-cut, but sorting people is a messy business in practice. In earlier times, the 
bank or retail finance officers who carried out the work of assessing the credit-
worthiness of individuals relied primarily on personal judgment. They met 
potential clients in person, and evaluated them based partly on their physical 
appearance, their demeanor, and their conversation. They encouraged and 
listened to local gossip. And thus lending decisions were typically grounded in 
the agents’ opinions and their practical experience with various “social types” 
and the assumed personal morality of various classes of customers. With the 
growth of these businesses and the accumulation of payment records by com-
panies, the process became more quantitative. The first credit reporting compa-
nies had emerged in the 19th century, collecting rough information about com-
panies (and then individuals), and using it to place borrowers within a 
standardized, ordinal classification scheme for the convenience of lenders 
(Carruthers and Cohen 2010; Ruef and Patterson 2009). By the 1950s, credit 
rating moved to probabilistic predictions based on statistical analyses of histor-
ical population data. But large quantities of non-financial personal information 
continued to be incorporated, such as marriages, promotions, and arrests 
(Furletti 2002). In the 1970s, with financial institutions and retailers now rou-
tinely reporting their lending activities, U.S. government institutions endorsed 
credit scoring – the numerical evaluation of a person’s reliability and integrity 
based on his or her individual credit file – as a neutral, objective way of as-
sessing creditworthiness that would promote fairness in credit markets and 
eliminate race-based discrimination (Marron 2009). The new forms of classifi-
                                                             
3  The Federal Housing Authority aggressively promoted the use of racial categories in mort-
gage finance and home building from its inception up until the 1970s (Freund 2010). 
4  In the United States, for instance, redlining on the basis race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex, handicap, or familial status has been illegal in housing since 1968 (Fair Housing Act), 
credit lending since 1974 (Equal Credit Opportunity Act), and banking since 1977 (Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act). It arguably survives in insurance. 
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cation were thus based on data about individual rather than group credit histo-
ries; they included provisions that made the collection and use of certain demo-
graphic data illegal; and they were impersonally administered.5 
Market classifications are part of a general movement toward the institu-
tionalization of “mechanized objectivity” (Porter 1995). Because they increase 
trust (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001) and efficiency, there is ample evidence that 
these new techniques have increased equality ex ante by broadening formal 
access to the financial system and shrinking the percentage of people excluded 
from services.6 Carefully graded assessments could now balance heightened 
risk with higher prices, and so the new classification technologies fueled a huge 
expansion of products specifically marketed to traditionally disadvantaged (and 
excluded) categories of people.7 
3.3  The Shifting Boundary: The Expansion of Credit in the United 
States 
The rise of credit scoring systems can also be seen as part of a long trend to-
wards the expansion of access to formal credit and the financial system more 
generally. As Cooper and Sherer put it, “any accounting contains a representa-
tion of a specific social and political context” (1984, 208). In the twentieth 
century, American policy elites generally regarded market exclusion, or lack of 
access to conventional market institutions, as both unfair and inefficient. Since 
the Progressive period, reformers of all stripes in the United States saw the 
expansion of mainstream credit access as a requirement of a well-functioning 
economic democracy. They also supported the moral argument that people 
ought to be protected from exploitative financial dealings. During the interwar 
                                                             
5  The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 makes it unlawful to discriminate applicants on 
the basis of the following categories: age, marital status, race, color, religion, national 
origin, receipt of public assistance, and good faith exercise of any Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act right (Hsia, 1978). In spite of these legal precautions, practices that are on face val-
ue-neutral may still have a disparate impact across populations because the characteristics 
recorded by scoring systems are not evenly distributed across subpopulations (Cohen-Cole 
2011; FRB 2007). 
6  Nevertheless, scoring has been shown to result in significant disadvantages for certain 
categories of the population. Minorities are more likely to be excluded from credit altogeth-
er, or to receive worse treatment than their white counterparts, net of other differences 
(FRB 2007). As Marron (2007, 111) puts it, “scoring undercuts the coherent identity of being 
“female“ or “black“ within which oppression or marginalization is experienced, displacing 
credit decisions onto an array of discrete characteristics or attributes seemingly innocent 
within themselves and seemingly individually predictive of repayment performance, inde-
pendent of subjective will.“ 
7  See Mian and Sufi (2009) on the mortgage market. They find considerable evidence that 
mortgages were actively marketed in subprime ZIP codes between 2002 and 2005, despite 
sharply declining relative income growth in those areas. See also Fligstein and Goldstein 
(2010). 
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period, for instance, experts from the Russell Sage Foundation actively and 
successfully mobilized to reform and develop the small loan industry (Ander-
son 2008; Carruthers, Guinnane, and Lee 2012). They reasoned that raising 
legal interest rates just slightly above usury law levels would attract main-
stream lenders to the small loans business and drive out illegal predatory lend-
ers. By the late 1930s, most states had followed their recommendation.8 
In addition to these private efforts, federal agencies also endorsed the “de-
mocratization” of credit. Expanding access became an explicit policy goal 
toward the end of the Great Depression, and from then on successive genera-
tions of policy makers embraced it as a means to accelerate social mobility, 
and, increasingly, generate economic growth (Quinn 2011). One of the most 
significant factors in the more recent development of the US credit market was 
a 1978 Supreme Court decision (Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. 
First of Omaha Service Corporation) ruling that state anti-usury laws regulat-
ing interest rates cannot be enforced against nationally-chartered banks based 
in other states. The Marquette decision caused national banks to relocate to 
states with the most lenient usury laws. This fueled a competitive race among 
states to attract banking business, which resulted in a weakening of usury regu-
lation and surveillance across the country (Langley 2009, 145; Sherman 2009). 
Further deregulation in the 1980s (such as the phasing out of Regulation Q) 
again increased competition among financial institutions, contributing to the 
Savings & Loan collapse, and to a wave of mergers and consolidation in the 
banking sector (Krippner 2012). 
What effects did these changes have on the relationship of households to the 
banking system? The data for this period is complex, and at times contradicto-
ry, but two trends are clear. Since the late 1980s there has been increased inclu-
sion at the boundary, and increased segmentation within the market. The per-
centage of U.S. households with a transaction account has increased 
significantly over the last three decades, particularly among the most socially 
disadvantaged categories of households (from 85% to 92% of all households 
between 1989 and 2007, but from 56% to 75% of households in the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution).9 Having a checking account is hardly 
equivalent to the democratization of access to credit, of course. In fact, the new 
banking inclusion notwithstanding, the percentage of people who report having 
difficulty accessing regular credit has also grown since the mid-1980s in prac-
tically every social category except the most privileged. So how was the unful-
filled desire for credit met? Framing the problem as if everyday borrowing had 
“a clear and unambiguous inclusive side, on the one hand, and an excluded 
outside, on the other” misses a big part of the picture (Langley 2009, 168). 
                                                             
8  Note that a very similar logic played out to legitimize micro-lending in the developing 
world. See, e.g., Roy (2010). 
9  Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2010. 
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Instead of the inclusive expansion of credit for the poor envisaged by early 
credit reformers, a new landscape has developed at the bottom end of the in-
come scale, which is marked by a blurring of boundaries between mainstream 
and fringe lenders. In particular, access to formal banking has set the stage for 
the rapid growth of payday lending (a form of salary advance), which – unlike 
earlier forms of marginal credit, such as pawning – requires the borrower have 
a bank account (Caskey 1994). 
The rapid and largely unfettered expansion of payday lending, of other ex-
pensive small scale credit providers, and of high fee credit services offered by 
banks did not take place in a political vacuum. It reflects, in part, the growing 
reliance of American political authorities on individual responsibility against 
top-down regulation in moralizing markets. In the consumers’ republic that 
flourished in the postwar period, protecting people from abuses by fettering 
markets ex ante was perceived as political and economic suicide, given prevail-
ing ideologies and the fact that domestic consumption drove over two-thirds of 
the national economic machine.10 Instead, better information and disclosure 
rules, as laid out in the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 or in the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974, were trusted to guard presumably rational consumers 
against the deceptive and high cost business practices that inevitably arose in 
this expanding market. These policies gained the upper hand in spite of numer-
ous studies and repeated congressional hearings documenting the low levels of 
financial literacy among the US population, particularly the poor and minorities 
(Lusardi and Tufano 2009).11 Unsurprisingly, the effect of these changes on 
equality has been much more questionable than promised. Inequities in the mar-
ket are thus now “less a matter of access to credit and abandonment, and more a 
matter of the differential interest rates that borrowers pay to lenders across both 
mainstream and alternative networks of borrowing” (Langley 2009, 168). By 
enabling and facilitating the differential pricing of people, scoring has expanded 
the reach of the market while opening the door to new forms of classification 
with powerful stratifying effects. The market expands at the boundary and then 
differentiates internally. We now turn to the latter process. 
3.4  Within-Market Classifications 
Individuals viewed through statistics no longer need to be classified as either 
‘in’ or ‘out’ of the market. Armed with a gradated sliding scale, people all 
along a spectrum of risk can be offered specially designed products at alterna-
tive terms and prices. (Poon 2009, 167) 
                                                             
10  Data from the World Bank (Household consumption as a percentage of GDP). 
11  Even face-to-face financial advice meant to teach consumers about the relative risks and 
benefits of different products is fraught with social tensions. See the very interesting work 
by Vargha (2011) on Hungary and by Lazarus (2012) on France. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  35 
These new forms are within-market classifications. Rather than dividing people 
into two mutually exclusive groups, the new devices position them in a cate-
gorical framework or on a continuous scale, the latter usually having key cut-
points or thresholds. Categories and thresholds restrict access to certain goods 
and services, specify their price, or both. Within-market classifications are very 
widespread, reaching ever more broadly across spheres of life and ever deeper 
into population segments. Companies keep records on their customers’ pur-
chasing behavior (or buy these from other firms), thus enhancing the pertinence 
and power of marketing and data collection. From an economic point of view 
this is the problem of managing moral hazard. The classifying institutions are 
meant to be performative. They steer behavior toward some desirable goal, and 
encourage people to stay on top of their commitments. There are incentives for 
compliance, material or symbolic rewards for success, and sanctions for failure. 
Rewards and punishments are often themselves acts of reclassification. Puni-
tive reclassification, for instance, may entail higher premiums, loss of privileg-
es, poorer service, or higher interest rates. 
Much of the regulation in neoliberal, and, importantly, post-segregation 
markets must come from within, from self-monitoring subjects: its accounting 
infrastructure is oriented to the responsible and efficient functioning of “calcu-
lating selves” (Cooper and Sherer 1984, 208; Hopwood 1994; Miller 1992; 
Miller and O’Leary 1987). Credit scores in particular have a moral aspect, 
tracking a person’s consumption choices dynamically, and reflecting on his or 
her evolving moral self. In this world, redemption for those who have failed is 
always available in principle. Only proper self-management is required. This 
sorting and scoring of people is disciplinary and productive. Its underlying 
structure and effects are subjectively incorporated. Both the scored and the 
score-users orient themselves to these measures and strategize about them, in a 
“reactive” effort to gain control (Espeland and Sauder 2007). For instance, 
fraudulent companies may send a flurry of unnecessary credit inquiries right 
before negotiating a loan with a customer, because they know an inquiry with-
out a subsequent loan will affect this person’s credit score negatively and thus 
boost the interest rate they can charge. For individuals, there is an advice indus-
try that teaches how to manage (or game) one’s credit score, or how to keep 
fees and premiums low. This knowledge is offered freely or packaged as a 
product by advocates online and in newspaper articles; by banks, debt consoli-
dation companies, bankruptcy lawyers, consultants, and firms marketing “FI-
CO security toolkits”. Other sources of knowledge include government agen-
cies, nonprofit organizations, academics concerned with financial literacy, and 
more. 
Self-monitoring within the system of credit classification has its limits. At 
the bottom end of the scoring scale are those who either do not have a score 
(because they do not use the mainstream credit system) or whose score is so 
low that it only serves to permanently maintain them outside of the system (and 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  36 
is thus less likely give rise to a form of deliberate management). The exclu-
sionary boundary still cuts through the inclusive world of credit scoring in the 
form of a stubborn stratum of unscorable, unscored, and underscored individu-
als – a Lumpenscoretariat composed mostly of poor people. In the National 
Financial Capability Study (FINRA, 2009), 56% of the people surveyed with 
incomes above $75,000 had obtained a credit report, as compared with 18% of 
those with incomes below $25,000. Economists typically explain this discrep-
ancy in self-surveillance in terms of disparities in “economic literacy” or, 
worse, sheer behavioral irrationality (e.g. Bertrand and Morse 2011). But what 
this difference captures, fundamentally, is the objective and subjective margin-
alization of the less privileged from the world of mainstream credit. Because 
credit behavior is recorded and interpreted as a sequence of individual choices, 
the vagaries of harsh circumstance, the power of differentiated markets, and the 
pressure of social competition – all of which powerfully structure how, where 
and when people borrow and repay – magically disappear from view. 
3.5  The Three Worlds of Credit in America 
As is clear from the examples and data we have discussed so far, the institu-
tional machinery for generating classification situations is to be found in its 
most developed form in the United States. The way the credit-scoring process 
erases circumstance seems an extraordinary irony in a country where people 
rely extensively on credit to compensate for the cover over holes in the welfare 
system (Prasad 2013). A 2009 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation survey of 
underbanked12 consumers in the United States found that 38% of them relied on 
highly exploitative “fringe” lenders (payday, for instance) to cover basic ex-
penses, and a further 19% used them to cover medical expenses, child care 
expenses, and lost income (FDIC 2009b, 42). For African-Americans especial-
ly, the incidence of these services increased markedly with the number of chil-
dren in the household.13 
It is the combination of weak social welfare provision and the abundance of 
variably-priced credit that makes classification situations consequential in 
liberal market economies. As Prasad (2013, 234-5) remarks, “there is a rela-
tionship between credit and the welfare state, such that where we see greater 
growth in credit we see less growth in the welfare state since the 1980s.” Fur-
thermore, “regulation suppresses credit in less well-developed welfare states, 
                                                             
12  In contrast with “unbanked“ consumers, who do not have a bank account, the “un-
derbanked“ (as defined by the FDIC) have a bank account but rely also on fringe lending to 
meet their day-to-day credit needs. 
13  The incidence of having used a payday lender in the past year, for instance, varied from 7% 
for African-American households with one child to 14% for households with four children 
(FDIC, 2009a). 
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while deregulation allows the credit-financed consumption of goods and ser-
vices that would be provided by the welfare state elsewhere.” 
Credit scores of the sort calculated by the U.S. credit bureaus are much less 
common in countries with more developed welfare states. Many have no pri-
vate credit reporting organizations at all. The information recorded by their 
public credit registries is extremely limited, and generally confined to identify-
ing seriously delinquent accounts (Miller 2003). Against the American view of 
credit as an instrument of individual empowerment, public authorities in France 
and Germany perceive loans to be threatening and dangerous (Trumbull 2012). 
Consequently, interest rate caps and levels of personal indebtedness are much 
lower, as is the market penetration of credit cards. About nine million personal 
credit cards circulate in France (about 0.17 per adult), compared to about 75 
million in the United Kingdom (about 1.4 per adult) and close to 1.2 billion in 
the United States (about 5.2 cards per adult).14 
In the United States, credit has long been seen as a “welfare-enhancing 
right” (Trumbull 2012). Earlier models of popular credit had a strong solidar-
istic basis. The first thrifts were “highly personal nonprofit associations” of 
“small groups of individuals [cooperating through structured savings] to 
achieve the common goal of home ownership” (Haveman and Rao 1997, 1616-
17). The bureaucratization of thrift in the early part of the twentieth century 
eroded the culture of personal relations and structured discipline by stressing to 
voluntary savings schemes. Still, mutual ideologies persisted through the de-
velopment of credit unions, mutual savings banks, and community develop-
ment banks. Since the 1970s, however, the normative basis of the case for 
credit has shifted. While the total number of customers served by mutualistic 
organizations did not decline substantially, its underlying organization 
changed. The older patchwork of local financial institutions disappeared. Credit 
unions gradually consolidated. Mutual savings banks were converted to a 
stock-ownership model. As the institutional form changed, and as lenders start-
ed reaching into new categories of previously excluded people, the moral life 
of credit changed, too. The idea that the poor ought to qualify for more favora-
ble terms because they were poor was gradually replaced by the idea – now 
almost completely taken-for-granted – that the terms of credit ought to depend 
solely on one’s prior credit-related behavior, as recorded in an increasingly 
mechanized reporting system.15 
Credit scores quantify individual performance, determining which services 
can be obtained, in terms of type (home equity, credit card, or payday loans), 
volume (how much credit is extended), and price (the interest rate, required 
                                                             
14  Source: US Census Bureau, 2012 projections. This is down from a peak of close to 1.5 billion 
in 2006. See <http://www.census.gov/compendia/ statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf>. 
15  We are grateful to Eve Chiapello for helping us articulate this point. 
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origination or balloon payments, and other fees).16 For instance, here is a crude 
but honest recommendation from the British industry publication The Banker:  
Stop trying to lend at low margin to accountants, lawyers and civil servants 
who are reliable but earn the bank peanuts. Instead, find the customers who 
used to be turned away; by using modern techniques, in credit scoring and se-
curitization, they can be transformed into profitable business.” (Langley 2009, 
473) 
The modern credit enterprise relies on the systematic measurement and exploi-
tation of social differences, by way of scoring systems. The flipside of market 
inclusion has been an acceleration of market segmentation. Populations have 
been incorporated and then matched to tailored industries and products. As a 
result, credit functions differently and is experienced differently across posi-
tions in the social structure. 
3.6  The Perils of Exploitation: Weighed Down by Necessity 
The normalization of high-interest credit products is one of the distinctive 
features of the relatively weakly regulated American credit economy that the 
United States represent. Fueled by the post-Marquette regulatory environment 
at the national level and the gutting of usury laws at the state level, the wide-
spread diffusion of “subprime” loans and the flourishing of the so-called 
“fringe” banking economy transformed the credit environment among borrow-
ers with low to moderate credit scores. The discrepancy between the interest 
rates paid by high credit-score borrowers and low credit-score borrowers has 
enormously increased since the late 1980s across all major product types, such 
as mortgages, car loans, and consumer loans (Grow and Epstein 2007). 
This trend was facilitated by the increased visibility of those on the low end 
of the social scale. They became better incorporated into the banking system 
but remained poorly served by it, with high barriers of entry into savings and 
investment products (Schneider and Tufano 2007) and continued difficulties in 
securing credit. The implied market opportunity was not lost on the most dy-
namic parts of the fringe-banking industry. As states relaxed laws against high-
cost, short-term borrowing, reputable, professional, rationalized market actors 
replaced the loan sharks of yesteryear. So-called “alternative financial services” 
(AFS) have grown rapidly in the United States and other liberal market econo-
mies, expanding and diversifying the supply of legitimate credit for previously 
excluded categories of people while also increasing its cost. For instance, the 
number of payday loan storefronts in the United States rose by an order of 
                                                             
16  For details on scoring technologies see Leyshon and Thrift (1999), Marron (2007) and Poon 
(2007). 
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magnitude between 1996 and 2007, from 2000 stores to 23,600.17 Lending in 
anticipation of tax refunds, which grew out of the tax preparation business, has 
also flourished. The Jackson Hewitt Corporation, which pioneered these expen-
sive short-term loans in advance of expected tax refunds, saw business grow 
from about 900 storefronts in 1993 to 6,000 in 2011. Not unlike the loan sharks 
they replaced, lenders of this kind remain relatively vulnerable to shifting polit-
ical moods. In the midst of the recession, AFS services have become easy 
targets of legislative and popular anger – see for instance changes in IRS regu-
lations,18 or recent state and federal actions against payday lenders, which have 
resulted in a sharp decline in the number of stores since the 2007 peak.19 But 
this decline masks a shift toward online lending and more mainstream financial 
services. Indeed, payday lending’s business model has been so successful that 
banks (whose action was initially confined to bankrolling the AFS industry) 
have adopted it, too. Many now offer “bank payday” services, as well as other 
fee-loaded services marketed under the label of consumer convenience.20 
The eighteen percent of the US population the FDIC (2009a) defines as 
“underbanked” are banked in the mainstream but loaned to in the fringe. What 
critics call economic predation is routine at the low end of the credit-scoring 
scale. This overlaps greatly, though not perfectly, with the bottom end of the 
income scale, and even more with the racially or ethnically dominated seg-
ments of the social structure.21 Loans from payday lenders typically carry annu-
alized interest rates above 400%, and up in the 700% range in some locations, 
and rollovers (which extend the fees generated by the initial loan) are not only 
extremely common but an essential component of the industry’s business mod-
el.22 At first glance, this situation seems to vindicate Marx’s grim assessment of 
usury in Volume III of Capital. There he critiques high-interest lending as a 
“subordinate” (i.e. derivative) form of exploitation “which runs parallel to the 
primary exploitation taking place in the production process itself.” As part of 
the financial system, usury preys on productive labor in a parasitic fashion: 
“Usury, just like trade, exploits a given mode of production, but does not create 
it; both relate to the mode of production from outside” (Marx 1981, 745). But – 
focused as he was on the intersection of money lending and capital accumula-
                                                             
17  For comparison, there were approximately 11,000 Starbucks coffee shops and 14,000 
McDonalds restaurants in the United States at the end of 2007. 
18  RALs (refund anticipation loans) are a by-product of an IRS decision to release to financial 
companies a “debt indicator“ flagging loan applicants owing back taxes. The IRS release was 
suspended in 1994 (but reinstated shortly thereafter), and again in 2011, effectively con-
demning the industry. 
19  In 2007, a federal law capped lending to military personnel to 36% APR. 
20  Automatic overdraft protections are an example. 
21  The proportion of Americans who resort to alternative financial services at least once a year 
is highest (24%) for people making less than $50,000/year. 
22  In the United States, rollovers of payday loans are actively encouraged by lenders. Their 
bottom line often depends on chronic borrowing (Stegman and Faris 2003). 
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tion – Marx also believed that usury was not particularly discriminating. It 
ruined rich estate owners and small producers alike, dissolving all forms of 
property and productive capital in the acid-bath of debt. 
Marx was too optimistic. He did not anticipate how a modern, credit-driven, 
consumer economy could weigh so heavily on workers’ incomes. Nor could he 
have predicted how the analytical tools of credit scoring would come to differ-
entiate the form and price of credit so effectively, even for those at the bottom 
of the market. The net result, as Harvey (2007) has argued, is that the consumer 
credit industry is characterized at the bottom-end by forms of material dispos-
session and subjective alienation similar to those Marx described in the world 
of production. Soederberg (2012, 495) describes this form of accumulation, 
where “a maximum amount of workers take on the greatest amount of debt at 
the highest interest rates and fees possible to extract ever higher rates of reve-
nue streams”, as “cannibalistic capitalism.” 
Those who are offered rotten terms in the market because they are riskier 
prospects are more likely to remain so when the terms on offer are rotten to 
begin with. Economists have shown that the use of fringe banking services 
traps people into cycles of debt, leading to higher rates of bankruptcy and fore-
closure (Melzer 2011; Skiba and Tobacman 2009). These cycles also exact a 
high personal and social toll, leading to higher rates of anxiety, divorce, or 
forced geographical mobility. 
For those individuals and households, the new regime does not so much 
teach financial self-control as resign them to the seemingly inevitable. People 
who live paycheck-to-paycheck – or without a paycheck – are rarely in a posi-
tion to plan systematically (Conley 1999). Perversely, means-tested social 
programs may “actively discourage low-income families from accumulating 
cash in bank accounts … lest they lose access to needed programs” (Newman 
and Chen 2007, 210). The lesson repeated over and over is that the extremely 
harsh economic conditions they face are a kind of natural market law. After all, 
the interest rates on their small loans – on the order of thirty percent per month 
– are objectively and legitimately tailored “for them” (Marron 2009, 151). In 
the United States, large differences by race and ethnicity (but also income) in 
the probability of denied and discouraged applications still persist, so minori-
ties are simply much more likely to not apply for credit for fear of being reject-
ed (Weller 2009). As Sudhir Venkatesh’s ethnographic material vividly illus-
trates, the  
prevailing wisdom [among African Americans] is that loan applications will 
be rejected. K.C., the co-owner of a Laundromat, puts it succinctly when he 
says, ‘We all try, time to time, to get to a bank, but a dog just don’t want to go 
back if all they do is get beat. I guess we need a year or so to forget that last 
beating, and then maybe we’ll go back. But most of us can’t get no money. 
Shit, I wouldn’t lend myself no money, knowing what kind of credit I got and 
how much I owe.’ (Venkatesh 2008, 121)  
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In other words, the exploitative credit regime is successful precisely because 
it is subjectively made sense of and incorporated, to some extent, as “normal.” 
Race features prominently in this moral compact. In focus group interviews 
conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending in 2010,23 African-American 
users of fringe banking services generally expressed broader support for a 
system that, they said, is there for them when no one else is: it is “just so hard 
to get anything from the banks.” Some even expressed sympathy for lenders 
who, after all, “are a business and [are] out to make money.” One interviewee 
remarked: “I do think [payday lending] is fair because you go in there knowing. 
You know what you need; you know what you’re going to pay. They’re taking 
a risk. They’re not doing credit checks.” Payday lenders were often preferred to 
banks for their comfort, the convenience of their hours of operation and loca-
tion, and the accommodating stance of their staff (bank employees, by contrast, 
could be “straight rude”). 
Racial differences in attitudes toward payday lending must be read against 
the long history of African-American exclusion and exploitation by lenders of 
all types. The objective experience of being rebuffed by mainstream credit 
providers, the expectation of paying more for similar services, and patterns of 
geographical proximity and distance all may sustain a set of specific subjective 
dispositions – in particular, greater mistrust toward banks, and a more benign 
attitude toward alternative financial providers. As Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 372) 
pointed out in a different context, “necessity imposes a taste for necessity 
which implies a form of adaptation to and consequently an acceptance of the 
necessary, a resignation to the inevitable, a deep-seated disposition which is in 
no way incompatible with a revolutionary intention…” Thus, while ambiva-
lence towards an exploitative institution was not absent (“[payday loans] can 
cripple you”), Blacks were more likely to see payday lending as a necessary 
and socially useful evil, affording them more dignity than other types of finan-
cial help, such as relying on charity or welfare. Financial exclusion tended to 
foster the conditions of its own acceptance. 
Meanwhile, in the same study, White interviewees – whose access to main-
stream credit has long been objectively better and subjectively much more self-
evident – saw their own reliance on fringe services, which often resulted from 
the closing of alternative mainstream possibilities, as an unfair downfall into a 
deeply repugnant system not made for them. They expressed a much greater 
rejection of the business, talking about “loans from hell”, and likening the 
practice of borrowing from payday lenders to “selling blood” and to “slavery.” 
But of course they were also more likely to have an easier time finding alterna-
tive sources of credit. 
                                                             
23  Cited with permission from the Center for Responsible Lending. Focus group interviews were 
broken down by race/ethnicity: Spanish language, Anglo and African-American. 
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3.7  The Difficulty of Measuring up: Economic Goodwill and 
Suffering 
The disciplining effect of credit scores is perhaps most evident in the middle 
sections of the social scale. It is there that we find the most articulated forms of 
what, paraphrasing Bourdieu’s (2005) analysis of the middle-class lifestyle, we 
can call economic “goodwill”. This is a distinctive combination of striving and 
straitening, desire and self-denial, hedonism and frustration. Here credit use 
expands and diversifies. The number of credit cards in a household, for in-
stance, rises continuously with income. Borrowers – often heeding the advice 
of popular financial gurus – use borrowing as an active strategy for asset-
building. And it is here, too, that credit scores matter the most. At the bottom, 
scores are often a blind spot, or a lost cause. At the very top, they are a natural 
gift, an afterthought, or a taken-for-granted personal quality. 
At the bottom of the middle class, the story is one of “middle class squeeze” 
(Wolff 2010) fueled by the admixture of oversupplied credit and stagnant real 
incomes. This market segment is where one finds the riskiest mortgage prod-
ucts, as grand aspirations and limited means are brokered into an unhealthy 
marriage. In the United States, these products are targeted towards non-white 
populations, as well as to the least educated. The foreclosed upon, who had to 
be wealthy enough to obtain a mortgage, and the bankrupt, for whom mortgag-
es were a major cause of bankruptcy, largely come from there.24 Thus in their 
1983 survey, Sullivan, Westbrook and Warren (1999, 331) found that personal 
bankruptcy is, by and large, an “ordinary story of middle-class people drown-
ing in debt”.25 But it is worth noting that the upper reaches of the middle class 
are drowning in debt, too. The exponential wealth accumulation and income 
gains among the top quintile drove an endless competition over lifestyle and a 
rapid increase in the price of assets. Those lower down in the income distribu-
tion did not do nearly so well. In the fourth quintile of the income distribution, 
income gains since the late 1970s were essentially nil. Those in the third quin-
tile saw their incomes decline in real terms. Consumers in these segments bor-
rowed more at less profitable terms, and leveraged their assets aggressively – 
usually with home equity loans – trying to keep up. It is in these sections of 
American society that one finds the highest debt/net worth and debt/income 
ratios (Wolff 2012, 2010).26 
                                                             
24  Almost 40% of the foreclosed upon and seriously delinquent mortgages come from borrow-
ers whose income is well above the median income of the area (Gruenstein Bocian, Li, Reid, 
and Quercia, 2012). 
25  However, the incidence of bankruptcy has moved noticeably down the income scale since 
then. See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2006). 
26  Over the last 20 years in the United States, debt-to income ratios have been highest in the 
third and fourth quintile of the income distribution (Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey 
of Consumer Finances). In 2007, these ratios reached respectively 155.4% for the fourth 
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In his analysis of the mortgage market, Bourdieu describes the middle-class 
experience of credit as an example of “petit-bourgeois suffering”.  
By embarking upon projects that are often too large for them, because they are 
measured against their aspirations rather than their possibilities, [the middle 
classes] lock themselves into impossible constraints, with no option but to 
cope with the consequences of their decisions, at an extraordinary cost in ten-
sions, and, at the same time, to strive to content themselves, as the expression 
goes, with the judgment reality has passed on their expectations. (Bourdieu 
2005, 186)  
We prefer the term “middle class” to the more archaic “petite bourgeoisie.” But 
Bourdieu puts his finger on the specific structural constraints faced by this 
group, which are at the root of its contradictory ethos of discipline and self-
gratification. The middle class is squeezed between the “morality of saving” 
and the “morality of credit” (Bourdieu, Boltanski, and Chamboredon 1963). 
Meanwhile, Daniel Bell (1996) also saw the unstable fusion of hedonistic in-
dulgence with agonized but morally consistent middleclass Protestant striving 
as the central cultural tension in modern American capitalism.27 This contradic-
tion is perhaps nowhere as clearer than in credit institutions and personal bank-
ruptcy laws that are at once punitive and redemptive (Skeel 2001). 
In a world of scores rather than classes, economic technologies transform 
this dilemma. On the one hand, they objectify the material constraint by ex-
panding consumer aspirations and the possibility of “keeping up with the 
Joneses”, albeit at differentiated prices and levels of vulnerability. But they 
also reinforce the practice of selfsurveillance. People can, in principle, take the 
measure of their constantly changing position on the FICO scale. First, the old-
fashioned face-to-face interaction between bank officers and clients – what 
Lazarus (2012) calls the test, or the trial, of credit (l’épreuve du crédit) – is 
now routinized, invisible and depersonalized, but also multiplied and repeated 
with every credit check. Second, with behavioral scoring, one’s credit possibili-
ties are a constantly moving target, readjusted with every activity. One’s credit 
identity thus becomes a dynamic project to be managed through an “ethic of 
improvement” (Marron 2009, 193), and in a manner all the more insatiable 
because good credit is seemingly within everyone’s reach. Hence the multipli-
cation of financial education programs (often state-sponsored), TV shows and 
pedagogical devices, in the US as elsewhere (Bay 2011; Fridman 2010). No 
wonder, then, that this is also where activity around the score intensifies rapid-
ly. Our analysis of FINRA data shows that the likelihood of checking one’s 
                                                                                                                                
quintile and 130.7% for the third quintile. In the same year the debt-to-income ratios of 
the bottom 40% households were “well below 100%“ (Weller 2012). 
27  In a phrase that now sounds even more archaic than “petite bourgeoisie“, Daniel Bell called 
this the problem of demanding that people be “straight by day and swingers by night“ (Bell, 
1996, p. xxv). 
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credit score or obtaining a credit report rises sharply with income and educa-
tion, and only tapers off for households with incomes above $150,000 per 
annum, and for people with advanced degrees (see FINRA 2009). 
3.8  The Benefits of Appreciation: Virtue and Privilege at the Top 
The top of the credit scoring scale overlaps in part with the top of the income 
and net worth scales, but even more closely with the top of the education scale 
(Lusardi 2011). The main virtue of the very high earners, from the point of 
view of algorithms, is that they are just less likely to overburden themselves 
with debt, or have difficulty managing payments. But the most “responsible” 
consumers also tend to be highly educated. They are best equipped with the 
cultural capital to navigate the business of credit and credit scoring. “Over all, 
those with the highest scores keep low revolving balances relative to their 
available credit; they don’t “max out” their credit cards; and they consistently 
make payments on time, even if it’s just the minimum required amount” 
(Carrns 2012). And thus credit providers compete fiercely to attract those peo-
ple who borrow large in absolute terms but repay in a predictable and con-
trolled way – mostly because they have the means to do so. And so additional 
benefits pile up, too, implicitly subsidized by the structure below. 
Whether it is earned or a byproduct of abundance, economic virtue generally 
brings material rewards. But the multipliers effects of an excellent score kick in 
even more strongly in the higher income and wealth brackets. Those who find 
themselves in this position can leverage their assets via the credit system to 
accumulate more at a cheaper cost. This is especially true when the value of 
those assets rises quickly, as it did during the 1990s and most of the 2000s. 
Through the financial system, they can also invest, make money work for them 
through stock ownership, rental properties or home ownership in desirable 
locations, and perhaps even live “by collecting interest” (Graeber 2010, 388). 
There are symbolic rewards, too. Those who think that market institutions 
are inevitably erase distinctions should attend to the astonishing prevalence of 
“private,” “exclusive,” or “elite” categories of membership across consumer 
markets of all kinds. Consumers who belong to the right categories – customers 
who are silver, gold, or platinumplated – get special treatment, better service, 
and all kinds of side material benefits.28 Their position appreciates, so to speak, 
because the system appreciates their position. Far from eliminating exclusion-
ary status distinctions, market society proliferates them. The key difference is 
that these honors and rewards are not bestowed by accident of birth or via some 
                                                             
28  For instance, various forms of insurance for their purchases. Or take the singling out of elite 
customers at the airport: first to enter and leave the plane, they have access to special areas 
(lounges, gates, parking spaces), and their names magically appear on the “cleared list“ 
while the hoi polloi are rebooked. 
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sumptuary law. Instead, bureaucratic systems track behaviors, record progress 
through the classification system, and rationally assess when particular cases 
will be elevated – or downgraded – to a new status. 
In this social stratum, the intertwining of material and symbolic benefits not 
only creates a sense of comfort around credit, it also fosters a sense of privi-
lege, and encourages a proactive attitude toward providers. In our analysis of 
FINRA data, we find that these are the people who shop around, refinance, 
rebalance their accounts frequently, and pay back their loans in advance. In 
periods of tight money, when the competition for customers with good credit 
intensifies, they are also the ones who benefit the most from government ac-
tions designed to ease the crunch. Thus a Wall Street Journal article reported 
that cash injections by the Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the 2008 credit 
crunch have almost exclusively benefited the most creditworthy, because banks 
would only lend to people in the higher-scoring brackets (e.g. above 700):  
‘even though we have the greatest monetary policy stimulus in the history of 
the Fed, we really have not managed to lower the funding costs for a large 
swath of people,’ said David Zervos, a bond strategist with Jefferies Inc., a 
Wall Street investment bank. He called Fed efforts ‘monetary policy for rich 
people.’ (Hilsenrath 2012) 
4.  Conclusion 
It is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system 
of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm intro-
duces … all the shading of individual differences. (Foucault 2012, 184) 
Much of the theoretical debate on stratification in the twentieth century orbited 
around three attractors: big classes grounded in exploitative labor relations, 
individual returns to human capital or skill in the market, and occupational-
level social closure, often built on some categorical identity. We propose to 
revisit class analysis in the light of techno-social changes generated by the 
advent of novel market devices. These devices segment, score, classify and 
target concrete individuals in increasingly precise ways, in a world where 
profits depend on exploiting these techniques effectively. We argue that under-
standing how classification situations are produced through the operation of 
scoring, segmenting and marketing instruments is essential to understanding 
the structure of new class situations, when class is conceived as the social dis-
tribution of life chances in markets. 
Credit scores commensurate people, classify and rank them (Espeland and 
Stevens 1998). Scores are attached to variable economic rewards (such as dif-
ferent interest rates), and are part of the process by which shared market-
situations are generated. This process is strengthened the more credit scores are 
routinely incorporated as assessment and screening devices in other markets, 
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such as insurance, employment, real-estate – even dating (FTC 2007; Silver-
Greenberg 2012; Wacquant 2009, 139). Credit scores facilitate differential 
pricing and terms of access to goods and services across a wide range of do-
mains. They are an active, independent force that structures people’s life-
chances via their financial position – all the more in a society where the median 
household debt is about double the median annual income – and which, once 
established, percolates to every aspect of people’s lives.29 
It is important to remember that while these scoring systems grew up in a 
social context already highly structured by established inequalities in occupa-
tional attainment, education, income, and racial stratification, they do not simp-
ly reproduce the status quo ante. Accurately tracked measures of credit-related 
behavior are far better predictors of outcomes than broad measures of educa-
tional attainment or racial classification (Fourcade and Healy 2013). That is 
one of the reasons lenders use them. Social scientists would use them, too, were 
they not trade secrets. Their analytical use and active application in markets 
does more than simply “freeze a certain state of the power relations” (Bourdieu 
1984, 482). It recreates these relations anew. If social class is the distribution of 
bundles of life-chances expressed as market situations, then we need to rethink 
class analysis through the prism of credit scores and similar devices. 
In the 1960s, there was a debate centered on the notion that “the poor pay 
more” (Caplovitz 1963). With the Great Society and the expansion of welfare 
programs, it waned. But its main idea – that being poor costs money, that firms 
looking to do business with the poor know this, and systematically exploit it – 
is worth retooling for a neoliberal era. Debt has become more accessible, but 
also a lot more expensive at the bottom end of the social scale. And now it is 
not simply the ‘poor’ that pay more, but much more specific categories of 
people, measured and targeted by moralized market instruments and differenti-
ated market institutions. Classification situations may have become the engine 
of modern class situations. 
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